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Technology, organization, territory:
a biographical interview with Michael Storper *
MICHAEL HOYLER, TIM FREYTAG and HEIKE JÖNS
Berkeley
You received your academic degrees at the University of California at Berkeley in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. How did this period and place influence your work and your approach to economic
geography?
The relationship was quite strong. I was a half generation too late for the revolution
of the 60s and early 70s, but from a very young age I had been attracted by all the
radical things that were happening at the period. So when I was thirteen or fourteen
years old, I was involved in demonstrations against the Vietnam war, hanging out
with people older than me. That’s probably one of the reasons why I went to
Berkeley. Things had happened at other universities, but Berkeley was the epicentre
of all this action and it had the additional attraction of being linked to San Francisco,
the epicentre of ‘counter-culture’.
I started out studying history and sociology. To be honest, what I was really
interested in was political activism. I was involved in the environmental movement at
the same time as I was studying. I took some classes that made me think about long-
term economic social development as a structured process. I can remember the
German sociologist Reinhard Bendix distinctly, who wrote classical books about the
* The following interview was conducted during the 7th Hettner Lectures at the University of
Heidelberg, given by Michael Storper in June 2003. It aims to retrace the making of Storper’s
relational economic geography by exploring links between biography, academic networks and
knowledge production (for recent theoretically informed enquiries into ‘geographical biographies’,
see Trevor J. Barnes, ‘Lives lived and lives told: biographies of geography’s quantitative
revolution’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 19 (2001) pp. 409-29; David N.
Livingstone, ‘Knowledge, space and the geographies of science’, in his Science, space and hermeneutics
(Heidelberg: Department of Geography, 2002) pp. 7-40). Secondly, we aim to contribute to
ongoing debates about Storper’s conceptual arguments, not least in German-speaking economic
geography, where his concept of a ‘holy trinity’ has recently been key to the call for a paradigmatic
change in the discipline (see Harald Bathelt and Johannes Glückler, Wirtschaftsgeographie: ökonomische
Beziehungen in räumlicher Perspektive (Stuttgart: Ulmer, 2002)). Finally, we hope that the interview’s
emphasis on the social construction of economic knowledge will encourage critical engagement
not only with Storper’s arguments but with one’s own positionality within the vibrant field of
economic geography.
This interview was first published in Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsgeographie (The German Journal of
Economic Geography) 48 (1) (2004) pp. 63-72 and is reprinted here with the permission of the editors.
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structure of industrial society. The other was a young instructor, Ann Swidler, who
taught classes about ‘the very long run’, a course about the history of family life from
1400 to the 20th century. Those two classes made me realize that the world is
structured by institutions. But I was also very interested in economics. This was the
time when the old economy was breaking down and the core regions of the country,
in the north-east, were losing their employment, the industries were shutting down,
they were moving to the south or to other countries. All these things were really
fascinating to me.
Towards the end of my undergraduate career I had to decide what to do. The
logical thing for me was to do a doctorate in sociology. So I applied to different
sociology departments, but sociology was a strange discipline at that time. It was torn
apart by disputes between ‘new radicals’, Marxists and others, and the ‘old schools’ of
structural functionalism. To a young person looking at the field, it was frightening to
see all of your professors fighting with each other. Then I thought about becoming
an economist, in particular because at Berkeley there were a few young radical
economists teaching about labour economics. The economy really interested me but,
once I started going beyond the radicals’ courses, I realized what economics was
likely to be like, which is, the maths was very difficult, the paradigms were very strict.
It was attractive in a scientific way, but I felt that I was probably never going to be
good enough at the mathematical modelling part to be a really good economist in the
standard sense of it. I struggled through it and learned how to do that stuff, but felt
in the heart that I wasn’t interested enough to put in the effort to be good.
I had a kind of a personal crisis, I thought, what am I going to do with my life? I
floundered around, and got more deeply involved in environmental activism. After a
number of campaigns in which I was a kind of voluntary citizen, militant type, I got
employed in the environmental group ‘Friends of the Earth’, who had its
headquarters in San Francisco. I started learning how to write reports, to analyze
things, flying back and forth to Washington, giving testimony, all the aspects of
political lobbying in America. In a way I laugh at it because I was way too young to
do it. I really enjoyed it and learned how to function in a political world a bit, but
after a while I wanted to go back and become an academic. I still didn’t know how I
was going to do this, go into economics, go into sociology…
Right at that time some friend of mine said, ‘There is this young assistant
professor in geography, Dick Walker, and you should go and talk to him’. I had never
taken a class in geography, it didn’t mean anything to me. So I went over and talked
to this young guy who had just arrived from the east coast, where he had been a
student of David Harvey. Everything that I was interested in, he was interested in.
He said to me ‘Why don’t you apply to the geography department?’ And that’s how it
happened. I started out working on environmental questions, but very quickly turned
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to questions of economic geography, the shifting locations of industry, the redrawing
of the map of the economy.
When you started your PhD in the geography department, you had not been influenced by any
geographical thinking before – you drew your intellectual inspirations from history, sociology and
economics. How did you experience this change in your academic affiliation?
When I came into geography there were, in the Berkeley faculty, a lot of people who
were interested in what we would call ‘geographical thought’. I can remember this
funny moment when I had to defend my dissertation proposal and the committee got
together. Dick Walker was my chair and I worked pretty closely with Allan Pred, and
there was Ann Markusen and Manuel Castells who both taught in the city planning
department and there was this geographer’s geographer named David Hooson. And
he said to me, ‘Tell me, what does this have to do with geography?’ Well, more
elegantly, he wanted me to show how it related to geographical thought. To be
honest, I had a weak culture in geographical thought and I still don’t have all that
strong a culture in what people would call the classics of geographical thought. My
culture is a lot stronger in classics of sociology and even economics and I think it
probably shows up in my work today. I’m really a social scientist. Geography has its
feet in a lot of different places, in social science, in history, in philosophy, and in the
physical sciences. And these other parts are relatively foreign to me. In the geography
department at Berkeley there were all kinds of different intellectual cultures
interacting and it took me a long time to understand all that was going on. In
addition, I had unusually strong relationships to this big group of students who were
studying regional economic development in the city planning department with
Manuel Castells, Peter Hall, Ann Markusen and a few other people. That was very
formative to me, because I had always been between and at the edge of different
disciplines.
Marxism
This was the time when Marxism was strong, when structuralism was very strong. To what degree
did you subscribe to a Marxist approach in your early research?
I was hardcore Marxist to begin with. Dick Walker, David Harvey’s star PhD student,
was known as ‘the new Marxist on campus’. He taught classes with a very strong
Marxist perspective, and in addition gave classes on how to read Marx’s Capital in a
place called the ‘East Bay Socialist School’. There was also Manuel Castells, Marxist
at that time, Ann Markusen, young leader of what is called the ‘Union for Radical
Political Economics’. There was a young economics professor called Michael Reich,
doing Marxist economics of labour. A number of us were trying to expand what
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David Harvey had begun in his book Social justice and the city1, and to push it forward
into a kind of full-fledged model of, in my case, an economic geography. The first
article that Dick Walker and I wrote together in 1981 was called “Capital and
industrial location”2. While I was still a student, we were beginning to outline ideas
that would find themselves later in our book The capitalist imperative3. It was an attempt
to see the process of spatial development in the same structured way that Marxists
saw the rest of the economy.
When did you start to explore alternative paths, divert from the pure Marxist way?
Very early on, actually. Dick Walker taught me the big picture about how Marxism
would view capitalism. Marxism says capitalists exploit workers, fair enough, but
when you start to look at specifics, a particular industry undergoing organizational
and locational change – what are the precise mechanisms and processes? In the early
years, what I was trying to do, was fill in missing layers in the Marxist analysis. I was
trying to give it what I would call ‘technological realism’. In my doctoral research, I
took four industries that were undergoing big change. Three of them were old
industries, steel, textiles and automobiles, and one of them was a new industry,
microelectronics, semiconductors. And I wanted to see how and why they were
relocating, and how they chose their relocations. In the middle of studying all of that,
I came to realize that a whole new economy was in the making. If you were trained in
Marxist radicalism in those days, you read Harry Braverman’s Labour and monopoly
capital4 in which he told the story that capitalists use technology to take the skills away
from workers: The purpose of technological change is to streamline and routinize
labour processes, so that labourers lose their skills, and their wages are reduced. And
that’s of course part of the process in a lot of industries. Even the non-Marxist
sociologists who had studied post-war modernization told this story. But no one had
yet analyzed a complete cycle of creation of new industries and new sectors.
Right in the middle of all that a number of us started to see the beginnings of
Silicon Valley in the San Francisco Bay area. For example, one of my fellow students,
AnnaLee Saxenian, wrote the first academic paper on Silicon Valley.5 She
1 David Harvey, Social justice and the city (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).
2 Richard Walker and Michael Storper, ‘Capital and industrial location’, Progress in Human Geography 5
(1981) pp. 473-509.
3 Richard Walker and Michael Storper, The capitalist imperative: territory, technology, and industrial growth
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
4 Harry Braverman, Labour and monopoly capital: the degradation of work in the twentieth century (New York,
London: Monthly Review Press, 1974).
5 AnnaLee Saxenian, ‘The urban contradictions of Silicon Valley: regional growth and the
restructuring of the semiconductor industry’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 7
(1983) pp. 237-61.
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subsequently went away to MIT to do her doctoral thesis, but we started out
together. We were a group of people who used to go on weekends to this funny
place, where there was this new electronics industry and ask, ‘What’s going on? This
is weird, what is all this about?’ The reality started to explode in my face. I began to
think that somehow, even though Marxism had a lot of good lessons, it just seemed
really incomplete. For one thing, it didn’t seem to get the story about innovation very
well. Marxism is obsessed with the notion of “crisis” in capitalism, and though Marx
himself suggested that crises can precede innovation, most Marxists are really just
interested in how such crises lead either to the downfall of capitalism or to negative
consequences for the working class. The latter is, of course an interesting issue, but
the former is not. Still, at that time, I wasn’t actually ready to make a clean break with
Marxism. It would take me a long time to actually figure out that in the end, though
Marxism calls our attention to the deep distributional conflicts in capitalism and to its
incessant dynamic of change, most such issues can be better analyzed with other
theories and approaches, and that Marxism’s political analyses are largely irrelevant.
Los Angeles
After finishing your degree in Berkeley, you went to UCLA. Your work started to focus on
Hollywood’s film industry and the nature of industrial clusters. How did this change come about and
how did your work relate to what is often referred to as the ‘California School’?
When I went down to UCLA, I got hired into the city planning department originally,
and who became my colleague? Ed Soja, a geographer. But also other people who
were not geographers, one of the major figures of thinking about cities, John
Friedmann, an Austrian who went to the United States, and Dolores Hayden, a
famous feminist student of cities. One year before I came to UCLA, Allen Scott had
arrived from Toronto. He was already beginning to think about the southern
California economy, about industrial systems and new forms of industrialization, as
were the Berkeley group because of Silicon Valley. So, another interesting collection
of people was forming in Los Angeles.
I got to Los Angeles and, as a good geographer, said to myself, ‘I should figure out
a new research project and do something here in the region.’ At the time the
newspapers in LA were filled with stories about the crisis of Hollywood and how
Hollywood was leaving, going to other places to shoot films. This reminded me of
issues I dealt with in my dissertation. Along with one of my fellow graduate students
from Berkeley who had come to LA also to work at that time, Susan Christopherson,
we decided to study the film industry. We asked why and how Hollywood was
undergoing reorganization and leaving southern California. However, in the middle
of our project we discovered that Hollywood was not leaving Hollywood. It was
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staying, but it was reorganizing and a whole new model of production organization
was coming about, which is what we would call today ‘flexible specialization’. In the
1920s, 30s and 40s there had been big firms in Hollywood, but starting in the 50s and
going through the 60s, 70s and 80s, these big firms had largely externalized their
production to small firms and now there was a project by project system of
production organization, which actually reinforced the agglomeration economies of
Hollywood. The average firm size in Hollywood had declined. We began to tell a
story about an industrial cluster, and in so doing discovered the subject.
Right in the middle of this work, Michael Piore and Charles Sabel published The
second industrial divide6. They had worked a lot on industrial districts in the ‘Third Italy’,
made a general theory out of it and made it known to English speaking audiences. It
was a big important book. The notion that we had gone from a mass production
economy into a flexibly organized network economy. 1984, that’s when Susan and I
are coming up with our interpretation of what’s going on in Hollywood, when
AnnaLee Saxenian is working on Silicon Valley, when Allen Scott is working on the
electronics components industry and the clothing industry in southern California.
Through the work of Piore and Sabel we learned that there were all these people who
had written about the phenomenon of small firm clusters in Italy. So we started to
read them, for example the classical book on Italy by Arnaldo Bagnasco, The three
Italies7. Then of course the Florentine school led by Giacomo Becattini. All of a
sudden there is this shape of a new world coming about. Until then what people
really thought about were big industries and mass production. Clusters, small firms
and networks just didn’t exist as a thought paradigm. It wasn’t what we were taught
to look for. It started to congeal at this moment, both empirically and theoretically.
The ‘California School’ – I don’t know if it really is a school – was only part of a
movement that was popping up in different places. There was the Piore and Sabel
branch, which was MIT-centered, there was what was going on in Italy, and later
there was a smattering of Germans trying to deal with places like Baden-
Württemberg, and a few Danes… The image of the new realities started to emerge
and then communication started to happen between the different places where
people were thinking about their own realities. The California School was in part a
reaction to that. That’s what became for me a second wave of theoretical work,
where Allen Scott and I tried to think about the theory of agglomeration. We tried to
draw on the classical works about the division of labour and scale and scope and how
changes in that might produce changes in the linkages of firms and hence the
6 Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel, The second industrial divide: possibilities for prosperity (New York:
Basic Books, 1984).
7 Arnaldo Bagnasco, Tre Italie: La problematica territoriale dello sviluppo italiano (Bologna: Il Mulino,
1977).
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geography of either clustering or spreading out. Once again, that was something that
wasn’t necessarily incompatible with Marxism but certainly wasn’t part of Marxism.
The ‘holy trinity’: technology, organization and territory
In your book ‘The regional world’, published in 1997, you come up with the concept of a ‘holy
trinity’ in which you link technology, organization and territory to explain regional differences in
economic development. How did you arrive at this heterodox approach?
To understand where this came from I need to add a couple of more biographical
elements. Already in the book that Dick Walker and I did in the late 1980s there was
a kind of hybrid thing going on. We were trying to deal with new, flexible forms of
industrialization by coming up with notions of technological and organizational
change that were behind the ‘capitalist imperative’. After this first phase of working
on theories of agglomeration and the division of labour I wanted to have a more
systematic understanding of technological and organizational change, of those forces
that would lead to agglomeration or dispersion of industry. I began to interact more
with economists and organization theorists. Around that time there were two really
interesting things happening. One was that some economists were starting to talk
about what is now known as evolutionary processes of technological change. They were
also talking about these processes as somehow institutionally structured. They began to
come up with the notion that technological change is highly structured by institutions
and that these institutions tend to differ from place to place. What we now call
national systems of innovation – why, say, is Germany developing some technologies
and going in one direction and the United States is developing other technologies and
going in a different direction? There were random factors, but what we actually end
up using or implementing gets selected by the institutions that are there to make
choices at certain points. There are then distinctive evolutionary pathways of
technology. They are not necessarily optimal or defined by any perfect efficiency
criterion. This was a major thing happening in the late 80s and early 90s and I started
to be interested in this because of my research in comparative industrial agglomeration.
I should also say that being involved in studies of agglomerations and local
industrial systems, both Allen Scott and I had begun to make regular trips to Italy
where we were interacting with the ‘Third Italy’ group. And we had started
interacting with the MIT group. I know there were things we were learning about
Baden-Württemberg at the time too, the people were starting to filter into the
English language literature. For one thing, Gary Herrigel had studied with Charles
Sabel and was writing for ‘Anglo-Saxons’ about Germany and then people like
Wolfgang Streek and a few others, I can remember papers coming out of the
Wissenschaftszentrum in Berlin. So, when you start interacting, two things happen to
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you intellectually. You begin to see the commonalities, but you also start to see
differences.
For me the question of difference and specificity in these forms of new industrial
development began to be interesting. I applied for a grant in the late 80s from the
German Marshall Fund of the United States. What I proposed to do was a three
country comparative study of industrial districts: United States, France and Italy. The
real reason that France was in there was because I spoke French. We had had more
interaction with the Italians, but I spoke French and thought I might as well play to
my talents, so I based myself in Paris. That’s where the European branch of the story
started. It was absolutely not planned to become Euro-American, which is in fact
what has happened to me. There is obviously a personal history side of it, falling in
love, the other thing was building networks of colleagues and intellectual networks
and getting invited back, ultimately leading to a kind of institutionalization. I ended
up being equally influenced by what was going on in the English-language world and
by what was happening in certain parts of Europe.
In that year funded by the German Marshall Fund I started out comparing
different institutional forms of industrial districts. It was really difficult to come up
with a theory. For example, I was comparing the furniture industry in the United
States and in the ‘Third Italy’. I thought, ok, I can describe this. In America, we make
furniture in large numbers, mass production. In Italy they make mostly design, high
quality furniture. What really struck me in trying to do this comparative work was
that the ways that people relate to each other are different. That seems very basic, but
in trying to study this question I met some French colleagues who were working on
what they called conventions. Ultimately institutions exist in our lives because we
incorporate them in our individual actions. They came up with the notion that the
way they are incorporated in our individual actions are through conventions, which
are something like principles of mutual expectations by which we relate to each
other. And these differ from industry to industry and from place to place.
I thought that this would be an interesting way to explain why the Italians organize
their furniture industry as a high quality design-oriented industry based on face-to-
face interpersonal contact, while the Americans apply principles of mass production
to theirs. In the actual daily life of doing this, there are different conventions at work.
Robert Salais and I came up with the idea that basically these were like systems of
action, which we called ‘worlds’ or ‘worlds of production’. So, we did a book together
on the subject, which came out in 1993 in French as Les mondes de production and then
in 1997 in English.8 Behind all that, I was seeing the geography issue and I began to
8 Robert Salais and Michael Storper, Les mondes de production: enquête sur l’identité économique de la France
(Paris: Éditions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 1993); Michael Storper and
Robert Salais, Worlds of production: the action frameworks of the economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1997).
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think that this was an interesting way into the comparative analysis of different
regions. It was the notion that regions are different because the people in them are
caught up in different systems of conventions, that is different systems of action and
co-ordination of their actions.
Most economic geography had concentrated on linkages in the sense of ‘linkages
are basically processes of trade’ – local trade in labour market or local trade in
products, inputs and outputs. Remember, this is against a background of an empirical
reality where there is less and less local trade in a lot of industries, there is long
distance trade, cheapening transport and cheapening communication. I do not mean
to say that local trade is never important. Obviously, when you look at industrial
clusters in the Third Italy, it is. Local trade is important. But at that time, even in
Silicon Valley, the system was maturing, there was a lot of long distance investment
in Singapore and Malaysia, there were factories being opened up in the interior of the
United States. So, what was going on in the local part of the system and why were
these people clustering together? From the work on conventions, I began to think,
maybe what these people share is not that they are shipping products back and forth
across the street, it’s that somehow they are co-ordinated by shared systems of action.
This is what I tried to capture in the term untraded interdependencies. These seemed to
matter more in some cases than the traded linkages.
And this is where the threads come together …
Yes, that led me to the holy trinity. I’d been really steeped in all this work about
technological change and evolutionary economics. All those people were talking
about ‘technological spillovers’. They were on to this mystery of technological change
which is both an individual and a collective process. From what I was thinking about
action systems and their geography, of people being close together because of sharing
principles that enable them to co-ordinate with each other, it was a short leap to
saying that maybe what actually enables people to bring about these technological
spillovers in localized space, is that they have untraded interdependencies between
each other. That was step number one: technologies in the holy trinity.
Then, step number two was firms. The most important form of organization in
capitalism is the firm. The economy is like a big puzzle of overlapping organizational
levels. There’s the sectoral level, the firm level, the industrial system level, the
technological field level, the regional level, the national level … for me it’s like an
organizational puzzle. It seemed to me that fundamentally to understand the
geography of the economy, you had to understand the construction, deconstruction
and reconstruction of its organizational forms. If you look at an economy in a
dynamic perspective, what you have are production systems that mutate – sometimes
into a big firm, sometimes into a fragmented production system, sometimes into
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combinations of these. That’s driven by technologies largely. The technologies drive
economies of scale and scope and transaction costs and that makes organizational
systems mutate into different forms. But firms exist partly because of shared action
systems among people that tie them together and make firms or production systems
work the way they do. That had to be the second element of a holy trinity.
And then of course, because of all the work on agglomeration, there was territory.
As a geographer, I had been able to see that technologies have a big impact on
driving these organizational mutations. And these organizational mutations in turn
create needs for co-ordination among the different units that are the results of those
processes. And the co-ordinations of those linkages have a geography. But it’s not
just that. Geography is not just an outcome but also a cause – now here is where I
really do have a geographer’s culture. Once you’ve studied places, you know that the
people in the places have shared conventions that enable them to co-ordinate. It’s an
additional level of co-ordination of modern economic and social life, that has its own
existence in addition to all the other levels that we know about, like sectors and firms.
And therefore geography actually could have feedback effects on how production
systems are organized and even on what kinds of technologies are produced because
the ability of people to co-ordinate together would have an effect on what kinds of
technological synergies they could have.
Three subdivisions, but each of them having dynamic feedbacks on the other. And
each of them being co-ordinated in hard ways through hard linkages and traded
processes, but also in soft ways through untraded interdependencies.
What inspired you to use a religious metaphor – holy trinity – for the three key elements of your
concept?
I was writing a paper for an Italian conference. There is this colloquium every two
years in Tuscany, which is organized by Professor Becattini’s group in Florence. It’s
called the ‘Incontri pratesi sullo sviluppo locale’ and is held in the Villa Medicea di
Artimino. I had been invited to this meeting before, but in 1996 they invited me to
give the opening speech in the town hall of Prato. I had to do it in Italian, so I had to
find some way to overcome the fact that my Italian is really terrible. I thought, ‘well,
I’ve got a triangle of things’ – this goes to show you how really silly these things are –
‘it’s a catholic country, what’s three things? It’s the holy trinity!’. I called up an Italian
friend and asked, ‘how do you say holy trinity in Italian?’ And so she said to me
Santissima Trinità. I wrote the speech and faxed it to her and she corrected all the
Italian, and I got up there in the town hall of Prato and said – it was the first time I
had ever gone public with this – I want to propose to you that the way you can see
regional development is as a holy trinity. That’s how it came about. Everyone laughed –
I got their attention, that was the story.
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Territorialization, embeddedness and relations
Your work has opened up the way for a relational perspective in economic geography that emphasizes
the importance of social and institutional contexts for economic processes. In sociology, Mark
Granovetter’s concept of embeddedness has been similarly influential.9 Do you see a link between
your notion of territory and Granovetter’s embeddedness?
I’ve always been very strongly admiring Mark Granovetter, who I think is a really
brilliant sociologist. That’s certainly something that inspired me as a geographer, that
these industrial systems, these processes of technology development and change are
not just sectorally determined, they’re not just determined by non-geographical
forces, something about places is making a distinctive contribution. The places are
not just outcomes, they’re causes. I’ve been struggling to make this point, to say that
economic geography is not just about showing that the economy has a geography.
That is, the economy expresses itself in geographical forms, but the geography makes
the economy. Now, where is the problem with that? The problem is that as an
assertion it doesn’t mean anything. And it can’t just be that the economy is spatially
differentiated, therefore the geography makes the economy. You have to show that
what happens in places has an influence on processes and forces that affect not only
that place but other places.
Embeddedness is a good starting point. It suggests that certain forms of social
actions are not transitive and contextless but somehow that the interaction context of
these things matters. Still, as a geographer I felt that embeddedness needed to be
pushed forward. There’s a kind of residual analytical vagueness in the concept of
embeddedness. In some senses the stuff I’ve been into more recently about
information and knowledge and how understanding and communicating certain
forms of knowledge depends not only on the knowledge itself but on the context in
which it operates.
For me, the way to deal with context was the concept of relations, that somehow
the action that a given economic agent can make depends on the interactions or the
relational context of that action. Economics tells us about the sovereign actor, who,
given a preference function and given some information, will make a choice. I’m of
course inspired by the critique of that position, which is that in a lot of situations,
we’re not fully sovereign, we are actually interdependent to some degree, but then,
what does interdependence mean? The way that I tried to give some substance to
that was through the concept of relations. I see it as part of the project of articulating
the notion of embeddedness.
9 Mark Granovetter, ‘Economic action and social structure: the problem of embeddedness’,
American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985) pp. 481-510.
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Cultural perspectives
More recently, the notion of a ‘cultural turn’ has entered Anglo-American economic geography. How
do you relate to this widening of perspectives in the field?
This might sound strange coming from me, because many hardcore economic
geographers or economists would probably see me as being very cultural. And yet
I’m personally very uncomfortable with much of what is self-defined as the cultural
turn in economic geography, actually the cultural turn in geography in general. I
criticized it in a polemical article I wrote about this subject.10 Behavioural,
institutional, cultural, historical processes are of great importance to the way any
economy develops. But the bottom line is, if you want to do good economic
geography, you have to have economics. And economics is about analyzing causal
processes that make markets work. I don’t mean work in a necessarily positive way –
it just enables us to get causes and effects. You can’t dissolve the economics out of
economic geography and still have economic geography.
The problem with certain people is that they want to describe the economy as one
big cultural process. But it isn’t. There are analytically describable forces in the
economy. The laws of supply and demand have really big effects, whether it’s in
Heidelberg or in Toulouse or in Bamako. I’m against the notion that the cultural
replaces the economic in economic geography. It may complement it, but it does not
replace it.
What about the study of economic actors and their cultural practices, which can add an important
dimension to understanding financial centres like the City of London, as, for example, Linda
McDowell’s work has shown?11
Of course there are many different and legitimate ways to study something like the
City of London. It’s a fantastically complex thing, it’s an economic system, it’s a
system of social practices and interactions, it has cultural dimensions, it has symbolic
dimensions, there are all kinds of social networks involved, it’s representative in
different ways, it’s got organizations, it’s got politics. So, sure, there is room for a lot
of different things to be going on there.
It does seem to me though, that if you decide that what you are going to do is
study the economic geography of, let’s say, the advanced financial services industry,
you cannot do that by merely calling attention to the cultures of the people involved.
In other words, you can’t say the economic geography of the advanced financial
10 Michael Storper, ‘The poverty of radical theory today: from the false promises of Marxism to the
mirage of the cultural turn’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25 (2001) pp. 155-79.
11 Linda McDowell, Capital culture: gender at work in the city (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
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services sector in the world economy, of which the City of London is a major
empirical manifestation, is explainable by the shared culture of financial managers,
for example. For it to become an economic geography explanation, the story would
have to be that the shared culture is the scarce resource, which the system
economizes in the best way by concentrating the people who have this scarce
resource in particular geographical areas. To tell an economic story, you have to, at
some point, use economics.
There is another thing that is very bothersome to me about some of what I’m
calling the ‘cultural turn’. The historical weakness of geography as a discipline is its
attraction to particularism and specificity, because of the belief that ‘real places are
specific and different’. The economists are the kings and queens of generality and
universality, and we’re the kings and queens of specificity and particularity. There is
an atavistic impulse in a lot of geography, we’ve got to fly back to localism. In my
view, the bad way to do that is to do old fashioned regional, ideographic geography.
The good way to do it is to develop general theories that enable you to explain
specific empirical processes. These can then be integrated into complex context-rich
cases. This is different, however, from just doing descriptive regional geography.
Economic perspectives
Almost parallel with the cultural turn in geography, we could witness a spatial turn in economics,
manifested in a so-called ‘New Economic Geography’. 12 How do you evaluate this development?
The economists are doing good and bad at the same time. Let’s start with the good
part of their critique. Five or six years ago, I heard a talk by Paul Krugman. He made
some points that hurt, but hit home. He said, ‘I read a bunch of this regional science
from the 50s, 60s and 70s, people like Walter Isard. A lot of what they were doing
was interesting but because they didn’t have a causal theory, they tried to deal with
complexity by piling on layers.’ So in the end you get a ‘layer cake’, which of course
just collapses under its own weight, which is exactly what happened to regional
science. The most unbelievably complex systems on systems on systems, really fancy
statistical analysis, but pretty bad theory.
Modern differential calculus, plus general or partial equilibrium theory can enable
you to cut through a lot of that and write simpler models than the regional scientist
could do. And that’s exactly what Krugman and the new economists did. They came
along with better math, better computers and a good mastery of general and partial
equilibrium theory and took all of these complex ‘layer cake systems’ and wrote what
are relatively simple models that do better. And here is the horrible paradox – it’s the
12 E.g. Masahisa Fujita, Paul Krugman and Anthony J. Venables, The spatial economy: cities, regions and
international trade (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1999).
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geographers who should have been thinking not just about places as complex things
that we have to describe densely. Places aren’t just isolated, they are in constant
relations to other places through factor mobility and trade, and hence each place’s
price formation and factor formation processes are caught up in relations of
exchange and competition with other places. The New Economic Geography
economists retheorized these relations in some very effective and innovative ways.
The bad part is that these economists don’t have much of the sensitivity that we
geographers, or sociologists or political scientists or students of technology have
about real economies. They have simplifications that we find violent and
unacceptable. Some of these economists are also very resistant to the soft side of
things, the more complex behavioural patterns, relational issues and all that.
Although economics of information is really into that now in very powerful ways. I’m
very divided about it. In a lot of ways, these economists made a genuine new
contribution, they put economics back into geography and geography back into
economics. Our job though is to now accept the advances they’ve made, but to show
them how to do it with greater geographical sensitivity. They are already at a risk of
trivializing it into a new form of regional science. And that would be too bad,
because the underlying questions they have opened up with their theoretical
innovations are really interesting and important.
Challenges
We have talked about two poles in current thinking about economic geography. One is the new
economists’ version of a geographical economics, the other a cultural turn in economic geography itself.
Where do you personally see the interesting and pressing theoretical questions for the field?
My dreamworld would be one where something like the holy trinity could be made
more and more precise and operational. I really believe that there is this field of
interlocking dynamics. And the problem is that each part of the holy trinity is in itself
very complex, because the dynamics of technology, the dynamics of organizations,
the dynamics of territories, each one in itself separately would be very difficult.
Because each has a hard and a soft side and each has an evolutionary dynamic that
also affects the evolutionary dynamic of the other. In fact, the reason that I proposed
it was to show that the geographical dynamics are not just outcomes but causes of
the economy and its structures. Here is where I have always felt that geography was
never given its fair recognition. You ask an economist, is technology important to the
evolutionary of the economy, and they’ll say yes. You ask an economist, are
institutions important to the evolution of the economy, and they’ll say yes. You ask
an economist, is politics important to the evolution of the economy, and they’ll say
yes. If you ask them about geography (at least until very recently), a lot of them will
83
say, ‘Mmh, I don’t know.’ And of course, that’s an error. Geography isn’t just an
expression of the economy, it also forms the economy. The holy trinity attempts to
suggest why this proposition makes scientific sense. So, I hope that there will be
work that pushes it forward and makes it more operational. The people who have
already made some progress in this direction are the evolutionary economists of
technology. But it’s up to us, really, to develop the tools and the analytical models
and the measures and the evidence.
There are also the classical questions: what are the changes in patterns of location,
in the specialization of cities, regions, and nations in the world economy, what are the
resulting patterns of trade and economic development? My sense of it is that every
social science discipline has things to contribute to those. But many of the essential
questions of the 21st century are questions about geography, because they concern
globalization (of goods, services, information and money), technological diffusion,
and migration. And we have better tools for dealing with them than we used to. I
think we now need a generation of rigorously-trained economic geographers who are
able and willing to tackle them.
